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By Gregg S. Gaffen, CFA, ASA
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Should some level of discount for lack of marketability be applied in the valuation of a controlling
ownership block of stock in a closely held company?

Expert witnesses continue to be challenged by

the Daubert ruling. States vary in their applica
tions of the ruling. Here's a summary of the

ruling's impact on states, along with a list of

resources for dealing with Daubert challenges,
as well as brief summaries of cases that have
been called "sons of Daubert."

Some states reject the Daubert ruling and

continue to use the Frye ruling to determine
the reliability of an expert's testimony. A few

more states use a combination of both rulings.
Here's a summary of the Frye ruling.

A practitioner shares his own experience to
tell expert witnesses some pitfalls to avoid.

Today's CPAs routinely work on a variety of projects for clients in both the public and private
sectors. These projects often require CPAs to research and use pertinent marketplace data.
Although financial and other information is abundantly available regarding the public marketplace,
meaningful information regarding the private marketplace is more difficult to obtain. This article
provides some insight for CPAs involved in analyzing private companies, particularly related to
initial public offering (IPO) activity.
"Valuation analysts regularly look to public stock market pricing and rates of return when valuing
shares of closely held companies."1 When doing so, valuation analysts must consider and adjust for
one of the primary valuation differences between the shares of a closely held company and those of
a company with an established public market—the ready marketability of the publicly traded shares.

Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies, defines marketability
as "the ability to quickly convert property to cash at minimal cost."1 All other factors being equal,
an investment is more valuable if it is easily marketable and, conversely, less valuable if it is not
easily marketable. The degree of marketability—or liquidity—is often one of the most important
issues in the valuation of a closely held security.
An IPO creates an active and efficient marketplace for the exchange of common stock that was
previously closely held. In other words, a successful IPO greatly increases the degree of liquidity
of the subject common stock.

Valuation analysts often (and unconsciously) fail to apply a discount for lack of marketability
(DLOM) when valuing controlling ownership interests in closely held companies. Furthermore, the
Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") has argued that the application of a DLOM when valuing
controlling ownership interests in closely held companies is inappropriate. In such cases, the
Service claims that such controlling ownership interests should be valued as if they were readily
marketable (or, effectively, publicly traded).
The rationale that is often presented for not applying some level of DLOM in the valuation of control
ling ownership interests is the hypothesis that a controlling owner can cause the subject company
to pursue an IPO, thereby creating liquidity for the common stock. To investigate the empirical validi
ty of this hypothesis, Willamette Management Associates developed its "Failed IPO Study."
Continued on page 2
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The Failed IPO Study examines companies
that filed an IPO registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
on Form S-1. Primarily, the Failed IPO Study
compares the number of these companies to
the number of companies that successfully
completed their IPO.

The Failed IPO Study, to date, is based on
quarterly stock market data from 1990
through 2002. The results of this study can
be observed on a quarterly, annual, and total
period basis. Furthermore, the data are com
piled both by industry classification and on
an aggregate (all industry) basis.
The key data gathered in the Failed IPO
Study include:
1. The number of IPO SEC registration
filings

2. The number of completed IPOs
3. IPO failure rates
4. The elapsed time from the IPO registra
tion filing date until the date of the
successful IPO

The Failed IPO Study also analyzes the suc
cessfully completed IPOs for which the sub
ject stock is no longer publicly traded. In such
cases, the study considers the length of the
time period from the IPO date until the date at
which the stock was no longer publicly traded
and the reason that the stock is no longer
publicly available.
Furthermore, the Failed IPO Study compares
IPO activity, including the number of IPO SEC
registration filings and IPO failure rates to
stock market/merger & acquisition (M&A)
transaction data. These market data include
stock market index pricing data and merger
and acquisition volume.

the likelihood of a closely held company suc
cessfully completing an IPO. Understanding
historical IPO failure rates can be useful to the
analyst valuing the common stock (and partic
ularly a controlling ownership block of com
mon stock) of a closely held company.

The Failed IPO Study analyzes IPO data for a
variety of time periods and industry classifica
tions. These data classifications should allow
valuation analysts to use the data that are
most meaningful to their subject analyses.
That is, valuation analysts will be able to
consider timely IPO failure rates and trends
and focus on IPO data for a specific industry.
Furthermore, the comparison of IPO activity
to other stock market/M&A transaction data,
mentioned above, can be used to recognize
leading IPO activity indicators as well as
correlations between IPO activity and certain
market data. This insight can help the valua
tion analyst form reasonable expectations
regarding near-term IPO opportunities for the
subject closely held company.

The Failed IPO Study is primarily intended to
help the valuation analyst answer the ques
tion: should some level of DLOM be applied in
the valuation of a controlling ownership block
of stock in a closely held company? In other
words, is there a relative lack of liquidity relat
ed to a controlling ownership interest in a
closely held company as compared with
publicly traded shares? A related question is,
"What is the probability of a liquidity event
occurring with regard to the subject closely
held company?"
Similarly, the Failed IPO Study is intended to
test the null hypothesis: The controlling owner
of a closely held corporation can create a liq
uidity event (i.e., convert stock into cash) by
implementing an IPO at a certain price, at a
low transaction cost, and in a relatively short
time frame.

Study Insights
Intent of the Failed
IPO Study
Willamette Management Associates devel
oped the Failed IPO Study in order to gain
insight into the IPO process and, particularly,

The following are the summary results, to
date, of the Failed IPO Study:

• From 1990 through 2002, approximately
8,100 companies filed IPO registration
statements with the SEC.
Continued on next page
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• Approximately 1,800, or 23.3 percent,
of those companies did not complete
the IPO.2

• The lowest IPO failure rate, by year,
was 10.0 percent for companies that
filed registration statements in 1991.

• The highest IPO failure rate, by year,
was 53.7 percent for companies that
filed registration statements in 2000.
• The fewest IPO registrations, totaling
163, were filed in 2001.
• The most IPO registrations, totaling
1,040, were filed in 1996.
• The agriculture, forestry, and fishing
industry had the lowest IPO failure rate
at 5.3 percent. That IPO failure rate is
based on 19 IPO registrations.

• The construction industry had the
highest IPO failure rate at 32.5 percent.
That IPO failure rate is based on 80
IPO registrations.

and within a short time period would cause
the value indications from these three valua
tion methods to appropriately value closely
held common stock absent the application of
a DLOM.

The summary results of the Failed IPO
Study, presented above, clearly illustrate
that even once a registration is filed with
the SEC, successful completion of an IPO is
highly uncertain. The study also indicates
that even successful IPOs occur, on aver
age, approximately three months following
the IPO registration filing date. Lastly, the
investment banking fees charged for the
successful completion of an IPO are typically
7.5 percent of the initial market capitaliza
tion for the stock. This percentage does not
include the other professional fees and
costs incurred during the IPO process.
Therefore, the common stock owners of
even a successful IPO candidate experience
the following elements of illiquidity:
1. An uncertain IPO stock price

Valuing Controlling
Ownership Interests
The generally accepted business valuation
approaches are the market approach, the
income approach, and the asset-based
approach. Common valuation methods with
regard to each of these three business valu
ation approaches are the guideline publicly
traded company method, the discounted
cash flow method, and the asset accumula
tion method, respectively. Of course, these
business valuation methods are also used in
the process of valuing the common stock.

The market data typically used in the applica
tion of these valuation methods lead to com
mon stock value indications at a level of mar
ketability similar to that of publicly traded
stock. This is because these three generally
accepted business valuation methods rely
heavily on capital market data (that is, pub
licly traded stock price or rate of return). As
such, only the opportunity for the subject
company to successfully complete an IPO at
a known, certain price, at a minimal cost,

2. A significant transaction cost
3. A significant time lag to achieve
amortization.

assist in the sale process, such as during
the prospective buyers' due diligence
processes. Legal and other professional fees
(including fees for a business broker) are
incurred during the sale negotiation process
and at the time of the transaction closing.
In addition, the seller may encounter unde
sirable income tax consequences as a result
of a sale of the closely held company. Or, if
the selling shareholder is less than a 100
percent owner, that controlling stockholder
may encounter dissention from other (non
selling) shareholders.
Also, the sale of a closely held company
usually takes at least six months, and it can
often take more than a year to complete.

The creation of an ESOP although providing
a favorable income tax consequence for the
selling stockholders, also involves substan
tial effort, time, and transaction costs.
Furthermore, the potential inability of the
company to obtain the necessary transac
tion financing, the potential limitations on
ESOP contributions by the company, and the
restrictions on qualified ESOP participants
often limit the opportunity for the sale of a
closely held corporation to an ESOP.

Other Sources for
Creating Liquidity

DLOM for Noncontrolling
Ownership Interests

The argument that controlling ownership
interests in closely held companies should
be valued as if readily marketable is also
premised on the availability of other sources
for creating liquidity. These potential
sources of investment liquidity primarily
include an arm's-length, third party sale of
the subject company and the creation of an
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).

The Failed IPO Study can also provide
insight when valuing noncontrolling owner
ship interests in closely held companies.
Some analysts argue that the valuation of
the closely held common stock of a nearterm IPO candidate company should reflect
the potential increased marketability. This
argument is implemented through the appli
cation of a significantly lower than normal
DLOM or no DLOM.

However, even the successful sale of a
closely held company requires the seller to
incur a substantial amount of effort, time,
and transaction cost. For example, the
company's financial statements must be
brought up to date. The company owners
(and other management personnel) are dis
tracted from their regular responsibilities to

While a noncontrolling owner cannot cause
an IPO, some analysts argue against a
DLOM when (1) the controlling owner has
expressed an interest in an IPO or (2) the
subject company is simply a strong candi
date for an IPO.
Continued on next page

2 As some registrations had been "pending" for several years as of the date of our most current data, we considered a registration to be "failed" if it had been more than 18

months since their filing. Most successful IPOs occur less than a year after filing an IPO registration statement. We believe that our 18-month cut-off period allows ample

time to complete a successful IPO.
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Continued from page 3

The current evidence providing empirical
support for the DLOM for noncontrolling
ownership interests falls into two categories:
studies of restricted stock transactions (that
is, "restricted stock studies") and studies
of private stock transactions in companies
that subsequently had an IPO (that is,
"pre-IPO studies").
The aforementioned studies are based on
prices of common stock that later became
either unrestricted and tradable or readily
marketable as the result of a successful IPO.
For the restricted stock studies, it was known
at the time of the transaction that the subject
common stock would become readily mar
ketable at some time within the next two
years. For the pre-IPO studies, at the times of
the private transactions in the subject com
mon stocks, the subject companies were
probably, at least, considering pursuing an
IPO. As such, any anticipated increases in
marketability were factored into the private
transaction prices. Therefore, the discounts
for lack of marketability calculated from these
studies set the minimum DLOM that should
be used for valuing the common stock of a
closely held company, subject to case specific
circumstances.

The restricted stock studies are quite consis
tent in indicating an average DLOM of approx
imately 30 percent. The pre-IPO studies pro
vide support for a somewhat higher DLOM of
approximately 45 percent.

The information derived from the Failed IPO
Study, combined with empirical evidence from
the above-mentioned DLOM studies, provide
the valuation analyst with the data necessary
to assess the DLOM to apply in valuing a
noncontrolling ownership interest in a company
that is likely to pursue an IPO in the near-term.
Furthermore, the overall to date IPO failure
rate of 23.3 percent, combined with the data
used in the DLOM studies, refutes the argu
ment that stock valuations of IPO candidates
should include a significantly lower than nor
mal DLOM or not include a DLOM.
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Summary and Conclusion
The Failed IPO Study initial results clearly indi
cate that there is a wide range in (1) the
annual number of IPO registration filings and
(2) IPO failure rates, both by year and by
industry. These variances support the use of
time-period-based and industry-based analy
ses when incorporating the Failed IPO Study
into a DLOM analysis.
The IPO failure rates indicated by the Failed
IPO Study, along with the price uncertainty,
transaction costs, and elapsed time required
for an IPO, invalidate the null hypothesis that
controlling ownership interests in closely held
companies should be valued as if readily mar
ketable (that is, without the application of
some DLOM).

The price/transaction uncertainty, transaction
costs, and elapsed timing related to other
sources of liquidity-creating events also sup
port the application of some DLOM when
valuing a controlling ownership interest in a
closely held company. Furthermore, the IPO
failure rate combined with the data used in
the DLOM studies support the application of a
DLOM of at least those indicated by the stud
ies when valuing a noncontrolling ownership
interest in a closely held company.
It should also be noted that the Study esti
mates failure rates for companies that filed an
IPO registration with the SEC. Obviously,
many companies seriously consider, and even
begin, the process of filing for an IPO but
never reach the registration step of the
process. As such, the "failure rate" when
including all companies that at least consider
pursuing an IPO is far greater than that when
including only those companies that actually
file an IPO registration statement. However,
measuring this incremental IPO failure rate
is impractical.

The Willamette Management Associates
Failed IPO Study is an ongoing process. As
additional transactional data become available
over time, additional analysis will be per
formed. We anticipate that these analyses

will identify more and longer-term IPO-related
trends than have been observed to date. We
will continue to update the Failed IPO Study
and to present the results of these Failed IPO
Study updates as they become available.
—Gregg Gaffen, CFA, ASA, is senior
manager at Willamette Management
Associates, Chicago. He can be contacted
at gsgaffen@willamette.com and
773-399-4330.

Complying
with Ethics
Interpretation
101-3: Nonattest
Services
As of December 31, 2004, practitioners
are required to comply with Ethics
Interpretation 101-3: Nonattest
Services. The documentation require
ment applies to all nonattest services
in process on or commencing after
December 31. The documentation
requirement became effective for new
engagements on December 31, 2003
but was deferred until December 31,
2004. The AICPA has developed addi
tional resources to help members fully
understand their professional responsi
bilities in complying with the new
rules. These resources include FAQs,
articles, background documents, and
other tools and can be accessed at
www.aicpa.org.

Daubert Application in the
Fifty States
At the federal level, trial courts and courts of
appeal broadly apply and interpret four princi
ples to determine the reliability of an expert's
scientific theory or technique. The four
principles are:
1. Testing Can the theory or technique
be tested?
2. Peer review. Has the theory or technique
been subject to peer review?
3. Error rates. Are there established stan
dards to control the use of the technique?

4. General acceptance. Is the technique
generally accepted in the relevant
technical community?

These principles, usually referred to as the
Daubert guidelines, were articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 C.
Ed. 2d 469 (1993)). Federal trial courts apply
the guidelines in their gatekeeping function of
determining the reliability and relevancy of
expert testimony.
State courts may or may not be influenced
by the Daubert guidelines. Alan Ratliff, a
Managing Director with Huron Consulting
Group (www.huronconsultinggroup.com)
has classified into five groups states that:

Dealing with Daubert
Challenges
Here are some resources that can help expert
witnesses to understand the impact of and how
to avoid or deal with Daubert challenges:

• "Guidelines for Guarding Against Daubert
Challenges To Expert Testimony," by Robert
F. Reilly, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFA, CPA Expert
(Summer 1999)

• "The Path to Credibility: Preparing to
Withstand Daubert Challenges," by Rob

Sons of Daubert

• Accept the Daubert principles. Twenty-six
states either accepted the Supreme
Court's decision or they already used a
similar test.

• Are open to Daubert. Four states are
willing to reconsider the rule they apply
to scientific testimony in light of the
Daubert guidelines.
• Reject Daubert. Ten states have rejected
Daubert, at least temporarily. They prefer
to follow the guidelines established in
Frye v. United States (54 App. D. C. 46,
293 F. 1013 No. 3968 Court of Appeals
of District of Columbia). See the sidebar
"The Frye Ruling" on page 6.
• Follow an alternative state standard.
Seven states follow guidelines based on
their state code of evidence.
• Modified Daubert. Four states apply a
combination of Frye or Daubert.
On its Web site, Huron Consulting Group
provides Ratliff's report, which includes
a list of states in each category, along with
a matrix of states in each category, and
a list of cases for each state. Visit www.
huronconsultinggroup.com and click on
"Resource Library" in the upper right of the
page to access the report.

Shaff, CPA Expert (Fall 2001).

• "Daubert, its Progeny, and Their Effect on
Family Law Litigation in State Courts" by
Stewart W. Gagnon, Fulbright and Jaworski
LLP, Houston. This article is available on the
American Association of Matrimonial
Lawyers Web site at www.aaml.org/
Articles/2000-6/GagnonDaubert.htm.
"Daubert, Disability, and Worklife
Expectancies," by David S. Gibson,
Vocational Econometrics, Inc.,
Louisville, Kentucky. Available at
http://www.vocecon. com/technical/
ftp/bibliography/daubwle. PDF.

Consulting

In the Summer 1999 CPA Expert, Robert
F. Reilly, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFA, dubbed
federal court decisions "sons of
Daubert" in that they expanded on
the guidelines:

• General Electric Co. v. Joiner (118 S.
CT.512 139 C.Ed. 2d 208). In this
case, "the Court concluded that feder
al courts of appeals must apply an
abuse-of-discretion standard when
they review a trial court's decision to
admit or exclude expert testimony...
The Supreme Court also concluded
that whether the specific Daubert fac
tors are appropriate measures of reli
ability in a particular case is a matter
the law grants the trial judge broad
latitude to determine."

• Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat
Marwick,3F. 3d 283 (7th Circuit,
1993). "[The] Court of appeals
excluded the testimony of a CPA
valuation expert.... the expert
used only one valuation method ...
to value the subject partnership
interests.... the Court of Appeals
specifically noted that the CPA valu
ation expert 'conceded that he did
not employ the methodology that
experts in valuation find essential.'"
• Kumho Tire Company Ltd., et al. v.
Patrick Carmichael et al.,(119 S.
Ct. 1167 (March 23,1999). "[The]
Supreme Court clearly ruled that
the Daubert factors—and the trial
court's gatekeeping functions
regarding the admission of expert
testimony—apply not only to scien
tific experts, but also to all 'techni
cal' or 'other specialized' experts."
• Target Market Publishing, Inc. v.
ADVO, Inc. 136 F.3d.1139, 1998
U.S. App. Lexis 2412. "The Court of
Appeals concluded that the Daubert
factors apply to valuation and
economic damages testimony."

Services Section
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The Frye Ruling
As Mr. Ratliff reports (see Daubert Applications in the Fifty States, p. 5), four states follow a "modified Daubert" along
with the ruling in Frye v. United States (54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013,No. 3968, Court of Appeals of District of
Columbia). Ten states have rejected Daubert in favor of Frye, which was decided more than 80 years ago on December
3, 1923. The Frye opinion is surprisingly brief and is bare of citations.
At issue is the admissibility of an expert witness's testimony. The following is are excerpts from the opinion:

".... In the course of the trial, counsel for defendant offered an expert witness to testify to the result of a decep
tion test made upon defendant....
"... the theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of
a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure. The rise thus produced is easily
detected and distinguished from the rise produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the
pressure rises higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination proceeds, while in the latter
case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure registers highest at the beginning of the examination, and grad
ually diminishes as the examination proceeds.

"Prior to the trial, defendant was subjected to this deception test, and counsel offered the scientist who conduct
ed the test as an expert to testify to the results obtained. The offer was objected to by counsel for the government,
and the court sustained the objection....

"Counsel for defendant, in their able presentation of the novel question involved, correctly state in their brief that no
cases directly in point have been found. The broad ground, however, upon which they plant their case, is succinctly
stated in their brief as follows:
'The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are admissible in evidence in those cases in which the
matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment
upon it, for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous
habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie
within the range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowl
edge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates are
admissible in evidence.'

"Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evi
dential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."

"We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made."
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Divorce Court: Three Pitfalls CPA
Experts Should Avoid
By William Barrett III, CPA
Nearly half of all recent first marriages
will end in divorce, according to pro
jections from the National Center for
Health Statistics.1 With a 50-50
chance of divorce facing newlyweds,
many may eventually need to turn to
CPAs for expertise. We will be called
upon more and more to help clients
navigate through divorce actions, but
to represent clients fairly, even the
most seasoned of CPA experts must
be aware of three divorce court traps:
valuation of equitable distribution,
lengthy written reports, and a profes
sional mindset on the stand.

Equitable Distribution
Larry Diehl does not excite easily.
The veteran divorce attorney, scholar
and true Luddite—a fax machine is
the closest he comes to communica
tion technology—does however get
all toasty and tingly when he hears
a testifying expert utter the word
"discount."

Diehl, who wrote much of the Code
of Virginia statutes on divorce,
has had his hand in many of the
Commonwealth's biggest divorce
cases. "When I hear the opposing
expert opine about discounts for lack
of marketability or a minority interest,
it is 'dead-on-arrival' for the other
side. To me, it is the greatest pitfall
that an expert can fall into."
The standard of value used in valuing
entities for marital dissolution varies
among states. Under Virginia Statute
§ 20.107.3, the term "fair value" is
called for in equitable distribution mat
ters. However, fair value is not
defined. To many accounting and legal
practitioners, the first valuation stan
dard that comes to mind is "fair mar
ket value." But there is a big differ

ence in valuing closely held business
es and professional practices for equi
table distribution in Virginia.

In Revenue Ruling 59-60, the IRS
established fair market value (FMV)
as the standard to use for a hypotheti
cal "arm's length" sale. FMV uses the
concept of a free-market transaction
where a property exchanges hands,
on a certain date, from a willing seller
to a willing buyer. Both parties are
under no compulsion to transact and
each has knowledge of all relevant
facts. Therefore the value established
reflects the labors of the seller and the
risks of the new buyer. The risks of
the buyer are evaluated and then dis
counted against the seller's value,
arriving at a fair market value. In other
words, both the buyer and the seller
are fairly represented in the final
transaction price.
In Virginia divorce actions (I say
Virginia because many states still
mandate the FMV standard in
divorce), a newer concept is being
perfected—the business will not be
sold. Therefore, another standard
—intrinsic value—is required to ascer
tain value as of a certain date. Intrinsic
value is the value of a business to a
specific owner based upon the worth
to husband and wife, and the value to
the marital partnership that the court is
dissolving (Code 1950, § 20-107.3,
subd. A). Intrinsic value is the real
worth of the business, as distinguished
from the current market price of a
business for sale.

The most recent and precedent-setting case in Virginia is the 1998
Circuit Court decision and 2000
Appellate Court affirmation in Howell
v. Howell. This complex case was
truly "a classic battle of the experts"
and hinged on the marital value of the
husband's partnership interest in a

large law firm. The husband's expert
stated that the value was the net of
his capital account plus his share of
the firm's net income, discounted for
minority status, marketability and
other issues.

The spouse's expert, Virginia CPA Bob
Raymond, used intrinsic value to
make his case. He took no discount
because no sale or transfer of partner
ship interest was foreseeable, and
no individual or group within the
firm exercised majority control. The
courts agreed.

"In light of Howell, it is reasonable to
conclude that use of the term 'fair
value' in Virginia is not as a valuation
term of art, but as a substitute for the
term 'intrinsic value."2

The Written Report
Carl Witmeyer is another veteran
divorce attorney who has also served
as a commissioner in chancery (a
court-appointed individual who rules
on fault issues, and in many Virginia
jurisdictions rules on equitable distri
bution). Witmeyer believes form over
substance in the written report is a
huge problem.

"When I see that the other side's
expert has handed in a 50-plus page
report, I know the trier of fact is going
to tune out somewhere in that pile,"
Witmeyer said. "Judges want the
basis and the merits of an expert's
opinion, yet many experts go off-tar
get in their written reports and in
testimony before the judge."
Carl also cites the Howell v. Howell
case. "Howell was heard before a
commissioner, a circuit court judge,
and the judges of the Virginia Court of
Appeals. The husband's expert had a
door-stopper-size report. The wife's
expert had a report that illustrated the

Kreider, Rose M. and Jason M. Fields. "Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 1996." U.S. Census Bureau: 2002.
www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf.

Raymond, Robert R., "Valuing Closely Held Businesses for Virginia Equitable Distribution," VAB News Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 7, 2003.
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issues and methodology to arrive at a marital
value. Bob [Raymond] stuck with the facts in
the case and presented them in a manner
that could be easily reviewed."
Since equitable distribution is so case-spe
cific in Virginia, the written report, like live
testimony, takes more than specialized
expertise to withstand challenge by the
opposing attorney and experts, and be
understood and relied upon by the judge.
Sometimes it comes down to the art of
the expert intuitively knowing what and
what not to say in the moment of writing
and speaking.
As Terry Batzli, a Virginia lawyer who spe
cializes in divorce valuation litigation, points
out, "You can be the most knowledgeable
valuation expert in the world, but if you can
not communicate properly in this tumultuous
environment, you will not prevail."

Professionalism
A third pitfall seems to plague the most
novice and most senior of experts:
professionalism on the stand.

In one of the first divorce cases I testified in,
I asked the attorney for her thoughts on my
testimony. She responded that the testimony
itself was spot-on. However, she said, "You
didn't need to be so mean to the other
attorney. He was just doing his job."
It is a revelation that still haunts me. The
attorney was essentially saying, "This is not
about you; it is about how others perceive
your professional opinion!"

Subjectively, I was "discounting" the value
of the opposing attorney's questions. At the
time, I thought the answers I gave were
straightforward explanations of neutral
opinion supported by case facts. While the
explanations may have been, the delivery
was not.

I picture the judge, silently listening, sea
soned by years of hearing divorce experts
testify. He is saying to himself, "Everyone
else here is just doing his job. But this guy is
taking it personally."

John Marcus, a nationally known valuation
expert, stated, "My [attorney] friend shared
her frustrations with me. She said that she
could either find an analyst with integrity and
no testimony experience, or an 'expert' with
much courtroom experience and no integrity
at all."
Note: The author wishes to thank the follow
ing attorneys for contributing to this article.
Each is a distinguished member of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers:
Lawrence D. Diehl, Attorney at Law,
Hopewell; Carl J. Witmeyer, II, Witmeyer &
Allen, PLC, Ashland; and Terrence R. Batzli,
Barnes & Batzli, PC, Glen Allen.

—William C. Barrett III, CPA CVA, CTP,
CCFM, of Richmond, can be contacted at
Bill. Barrett@BarrettPC. com.
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